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Introduction
Boolean functions, that is, F 2 -valued functions defined over the vector space F n 2 of all binary vectors of a given length n, are used in the S-boxes of block ciphers and in the pseudo-random generators of stream ciphers. They play a central role in their security.
In stream ciphers, the main model for the generation of the keystream consists of a linear part, producing a sequence with a large period, usually composed of one or several LFSRs, and a nonlinear combining or filtering function f which produces the output, given the state of the linear part. In the nonlinear combiner sub-model, the outputs to several LFSRs are combined using a nonlinear Boolean function to produce the keystream. In the nonlinear filter sub-model, the content of some of the flip-flops in a single (longer) LFSR constitute the input to a nonlinear Boolean function which produces the keystream. These models which are very efficient, in particular in hardware, have undergone a lot of cryptanalysis and to resist those attacks, different design criteria have been proposed for both the LFSRs and the combining Boolean function. The main classical cryptographic criteria for designing the function f are balancedness (f is balanced if its Hamming weight equals 2 n−1 ) to prevent the system from leaking statistical information on the plaintext when the ciphertext is known, a high algebraic degree (that is, a high degree of the algebraic normal form of the function) to prevent the system from Massey's attack by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm (cf. [31, 39] , see also [34] ), the non-existence of (non-zero) linear structure a ∈ F n 2 (such that f (x + a) + f (x) is constant) so that the function effectively depends on all its variables, a high order of correlation immunity (and more precisely, of resiliency, since the functions must be balanced -a function is t-resilient if each of its restrictions obtained by keeping constant t input bits is balanced) to counter correlation attacks (in the case of combining functions), and a high nonlinearity (that is, a large Hamming distance to affine functions) to withstand correlation attacks (again) and linear attacks.
The recent algebraic attacks [15] have led to further characteristics that a cryptographic Boolean function must have. These attacks cleverly use overdefined systems of multivariate nonlinear equations to recover the secret key (the idea of using such systems comes from C. Shannon [40] , but the improvement in the efficiency of the method is recent). The core of the analysis in the standard algebraic attack is to find out low degree functions g = 0 and h such that f g = h. It has been shown in [37] that this is equivalent to the existence of a low degree nonzero annihilator of f or of 1 + f , that is, of a function g such that f g = 0 (i.e. whose support is disjoint of that of f ) or (1 + f )g = 0.
The minimum degree of such g is called the (basic) algebraic immunity of f and must be as high as possible (the maximum being n 2 ). This condition is not sufficient, since a function can have sufficiently high algebraic immunity and be weak against fast algebraic attacks [16] . If one can find g of low degree and h = 0 such that f g = h, then a fast algebraic attack is feasible if the degree of h is not too high, see [16, 1, 24] . Since f g = h implies f h = f f g = f g = h, we see that h is then an annihilator of f + 1 and its degree is then at least equal to the algebraic immunity of f . This means that having a high algebraic immunity is not only a necessary condition for a resistance to standard algebraic attacks but also for a resistance to fast algebraic attacks.
Some of the criteria above play also important roles for S-boxes in block ciphers: the nonlinearity (cf. the linear attack by Matsui [32] , see also [12] ) and the algebraic degree (the complexity of the "higher order differential attack" on block ciphers due to Knudsen and Lai [26, 28] depends on the algebraic degrees of the Boolean functions involved in the system).
But these criteria must be considered in an extended way: suppose that, given a function which does not satisfy some criterion, it is possible, by changing one or a few bits in its output (that is, in its truth-table) to obtain a function which satisfies the criterion; then this criterion cannot have a general relevance to cryptography, since this change does not fundamentally modify the robustness of the system using this function (however, this situation is not quite the same according to whether the function is used in a synchronous stream cipher, a selfsynchronizing stream cipher or a block cipher). Some papers in the literature have already addressed this problem for some criteria: see [38] for the criterion of non-existence of nonzero linear structure (Meier and Staffelbach considered the so-called distance to linear structures) and [29, 10] for the resiliency criterion. Some other criteria -for instance the nonlinearity -do not change much when a few bits of the output to the function are changed; hence, they do not need such extension. On the contrary, changing one single bit in the output to an n-variable function of algebraic degree at most n − 1 moves its degree to n, and if, starting from a balanced function we want to keep balancedness, changing two bits moves it almost surely to n − 1. A natural way of putting this right is to do as Meier and Staffelbach did for the linear structures, considering, for every r < n, the minimum Hamming distance to all functions of degrees at most r (whose set is the so-called r-th order Reed-Muller code and will be denoted by RM (r)). This distance is usually called the r-th order nonlinearity of the function (and more simply its nonlinearity in the first-order case).
We shall call the nonlinearity profile of a function the sequence whose r-th term, for r = 1, . . . , n − 1, equals the r-th order nonlinearity of the function. Note that the nonlinearity profile is extended-affine-invariant, in the sense that if φ is an affine automorphism of F n 2 and if is an affine Boolean function on F n 2 , then for every n-variable Boolean function f , the nonlinearity profile of the function f • φ + equals that of f . The best known upper bound on the r-th order nonlinearity of general functions has been given in [11] . Several papers have shown the role played by this parameter in relation to some cryptanalyses (note that, contrary to the first order nonlinearity, it must have low value for allowing the attacks to be realistic) and studied it from an algorithmic viewpoint [14, 23, 25, 27, 33, 35] . However, very few have attempted to give constructions of functions with reasonably good nonlinearity profile or to show general properties of this parameter [25] . In fact, until recently, almost nothing relevant was known on this criterion (see Section 2). Fortunately, it has been shown lately that, if the algebraic immunity AI(f ) of a function f is known, then we can deduce a lower bound on its r-th order nonlinearity for every r ≤ AI(f ) − 1: for the first order, see [17] and the improvement of [30] ; for any order, see [8] (see Section 2 for a recall of these bounds). This changes completely the situation with the nonlinearity profile. In this paper, we obtain a new bound which improves upon the bound of [8] for all values of AI(f ) when the number of variables is smaller than or equal to 12, and for most values of AI(f ) when the number of variables is smaller than or equal to 22 (which covers the practical situation of stream ciphers). It also improves asymptotically upon it.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 are given the necessary definitions and properties of the main cryptographic criteria on Boolean functions. In Section 3, we study the dimension of the vector space of annihilators with prescribed algebraic degrees, of a Boolean function with given algebraic degree. The results of this section are used in Section 4 to obtain the lower bound on the r-th order nonlinearity of a function of given algebraic immunity. Finally, in Section 5, we show that the bound of Section 4 simplifies the question of designing cryptographic Boolean functions meeting all necessary criteria.
Preliminaries
Let n be any positive integer. Any Boolean function f on n variables admits a unique algebraic normal form (ANF):
where the a I 's are in F 2 . The terms i∈I x i are called monomials. The algebraic degree d
• f of a Boolean function f equals the maximum degree of those monomials whose coefficients are nonzero in its algebraic normal form. Affine functions are those Boolean functions of degrees at most 1.
and where
wt(u), where wt(u) denotes the Hamming weight |{i = 1, . . . , n / u i = 1}| of u. Note that, for every x ∈ F n 2 , we have then f (x) = u x a u , where u x means that every coordinate of u is upper bounded by the corresponding coordinate of x, that is, that the support of u is included in the support of x.
The Hamming weight of a Boolean function is the Hamming weight of its list of values, that is, the size of its support {x ∈ F n 2 / f (x) = 1}. The Hamming distance between two Boolean functions is the Hamming weight of
be an n-variable Boolean function. Let r be a positive integer such that r ≤ n. The r-th order nonlinearity of f is the minimum Hamming distance between f and all n-variable functions of algebraic degrees at most r.
We shall denote the r-th order nonlinearity of f by nl r (f ). The first-order nonlinearity of f is simply called the nonlinearity of f and denoted by nl(f ). Clearly we have nl r (f ) = 0 if and only if f has degree at most r. So, the knowledge of the nonlinearity profile (i.e. of all the nonlinearities of orders r ≥ 1) of a Boolean function includes the knowledge of its algebraic degree. It is in fact a much more complete cryptographic parameter than are the single (first-order) nonlinearity and the algebraic degree: the former is not sufficient for knowing the cryptographic behavior of a function (it does not allow to quantify for instance the resistance to Berlekamp-Massey attack) and the latter is still less sufficient, as explained in introduction. As far as we know, the nonlinearity profile (or a great part of it) is known in general only for quadratic functions (the functions of algebraic degrees at most 2) and for their sums with functions of very small Hamming weights. Indeed, the first-order nonlinearities of quadratic functions are known (see [36] ) and the r-th order nonlinearity of a quadratic function is obviously null for every r ≥ 2. The first-order nonlinearities of the functions of degrees greater than or equal to 3 are unknown, except for some particular primary constructions of Boolean functions (such as the indicators of flats, or some concatenations of such indicators or of quadratic functions -including the Maiorana-McFarland functions) and for some secondary constructions; nothing is known on the second-order nonlinearities of functions of degrees at least 3 (except for functions of small weights). In the case of functions of small Hamming weights (e.g. the indicators of flats of small dimensions), the r-th order nonlinearity is equal, for sufficiently low values of r (namely, for 2 n−r > 2wt(f )), to the weight wt(f ) itself. The algebraic immunity [37] of a Boolean function f quantifies the resistance to the standard algebraic attack of the pseudo-random generators using it as a nonlinear function. Definition 2. Let f : F n 2 → F 2 be an n-variable Boolean function. We call annihilator of f any n-variable function g whose product with f is null (i.e. whose support is included in the support of f + 1, or in other words any function which is a multiple of f + 1). The algebraic immunity of f is the minimum algebraic degree of all the nonzero annihilators of f or of f + 1.
We shall denote the algebraic immunity of f by AI(f ). A very useful property is its affine invariance: for every affine automorphism φ of F n 2 , we have AI(f • φ) = AI(f ). This comes from the affine invariance of the algebraic degree.
Clearly, since f is an annihilator of f + 1 (and f + 1 is an annihilator of f ) we have AI(f ) ≤ d
• f . As shown in [15] , we always have AI(f ) ≤ n 2 . This bound is tight (see below). Also, we know that almost all Boolean functions have algebraic immunities close to this optimum; more precisely, for all a < 1, AI(f) is almost surely greater than n 2 − n 2 ln n a ln 2 when n tends to infinity: see [21] . Even when restricting ourselves to functions with optimum algebraic immunity, the algebraic attacks oblige to use now functions on at least 13 variables, see [4, 8] (this number is a strict minimum and is in fact risky; a safer number of variables would better be near 20).
Very few functions are known (up to affine equivalence) with provably optimum algebraic immunities: the functions whose construction is introduced in [18] (see in [8] their further properties) and some functions which are symmetric (that is, whose outputs depend only on the Hamming weights of their inputs) [19, 3] . These functions have some drawbacks: all of them have insufficient nonlinearities and all but one are non-balanced. Moreover, the functions studied in [19, 3] , and to a slightly smaller extent the functions introduced in [18] , have not a good behavior against fast algebraic attacks, see [2, 20] . But the research in this domain is very active and it is probable that better examples of functions will be found in the future.
It was shown in [17] that the weight of a function f with given algebraic immunity satisfies:
In particular, if n is odd and f has optimum algebraic immunity, then f is balanced.
The first lower bound on the (first-order) nonlinearity of functions with given algebraic immunity has been obtained in [17] : nl(f ) ≥ AI(f )−2 i=0 n i . In [30] , M. Lobanov has improved upon this lower bound:
. In [8] , an easy generalization to the r-th order nonlinearity of the bound obtained in [17] has been given: nl r (f ) ≥ AI(f )−r−1 i=0 n i . In the present paper, we extend Lobanov's bound into a bound which improves, asymptotically and in most cases of practical situations, upon the bound obtained in [8] . This bound is related to the dimension of the annihilators with prescribed algebraic degrees of Boolean functions with given algebraic degrees.
3 The dimension of the vector space of prescribed degree annihilators of a function
The number of linearly independent low degree annihilators of a given Boolean function f and of the function f + 1 is an important parameter for evaluating the complexity of algebraic attacks on the systems using this function. We shall see in the next section that it plays also an important role in relation to the r-th order nonlinearity.
Definition 3. Let h be an n-variable Boolean function. We denote by An k (h) the vector space of those annihilators of degrees at most k of h and by
Little is known on the behavior of d k,h . For k = n, we have clearly d n,h = 2 n − wt(h) since An n (h) contains all functions whose supports are disjoint of that of h. It is also shown in [17, 8] . Also, Lobanov [30] showed that for every non-constant affine function h and every k, we have
. Before introducing an upper bound on d k,h which is valid for all functions, we generalize Lobanov's result by determining the values of d k,h for several classes of functions. This will be useful in the sequel. Proposition 1. Let h be any n-variable function of degree r, such that 0 ≤ r ≤ n, and of weight 2 n−r . Then for every k ≥ 0 we have
n−r i .
Proof:
We know that h is the indicator of an (n − r)-dimensional flat (see e.g. [36] ), and thanks to the affine invariance of the algebraic immunity, we may without loss of generality assume that it equals (x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1) · · · (x r + 1). The system characterizing the elements of An k (h), that is, the system of all equations . Note that, in the case r = 1, this is the value given by Lobanov for non-constant affine functions.
Proposition 2.
Let h be any n-variable function of degree r, such that 0 ≤ r ≤ n, and of weight 2 n − 2 n−r . Then for every k ≥ 0 we have
n−r i
.
Proof:
h + 1 is the indicator of an (n − r)-dimensional flat, and we may without loss of generality assume that it equals x 1 x 2 · · · x r . Then the elements of An k (h) are the products of x 1 x 2 · · · x r with those functions in the variables x r+1 , . . . , x n whose degrees are at most k − r.
. In the case r = 1, this is also the value given by Lobanov.
Proposition 3. Let t be an integer such that t ≤ n and let h be the symmetric function defined by h(x) = 1 if and only if wt(x) < t. Then, for every k, we have
The coefficients in the ANFs of the elements of An k (h) are the solutions of the system of equations u x | wt(u)≤k a u = 0, where x ranges over the set of vectors of weights strictly smaller than t. If k ≥ t − 1, then these equations become u x a u = 0 and these ANFs are the polynomials such that a u = 0 if wt(u) < t (and a u is any element of F 2 if t ≤ wt(u) ≤ k). Otherwise, it is clear that An k (h) = {0}. If t ≤ n 2 , we have then AI(h) = t, since it is easy to show then that An k (h + 1) does not contain nonzero functions of degrees strictly smaller than t. Note that, denoting by f the majority function (i.e. the symmetric function of support {x ∈ F n 2 / wt(x) ≥ n 2 ), Proposition 3 with t = n 2 (resp. with t = n 2 + 1) gives the value of d k,f +1 (resp. of d k,f , thanks to affine invariance).
The functions studied in Propositions 1 and 2 are balanced when r = 1 only, and those studied in Proposition 3 are balanced when t = n+1 2 (n odd). We study in the next proposition a more general case of balanced functions.
Proposition 4.
Let h be an n-variable function of weight 2 n−r (1 < r ≤ n − 1) and a non-constant affine function such that h + is balanced. Then
Proof:
We may without loss of generality assume that h(x) equals (x 1 +1)(x 2 +1) · · · (x r + 1) and that l(x) is the function x r+1 . The annihilators of h + are then the multiples of (x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1) · · · (x r + 1) + (x r+1 + 1). Let (x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1) · · · (x r + 1) + (x r+1 + 1) u∈F n 2 a u x u be such a multiple.
1. For every u such that u r+1 = 1 and for which there exists i ≤ r such that u i = 1, we have ((x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1) · · · (x r + 1) + (x r+1 + 1)) x u = 0. Hence, we must not take this case into account when quantifying the dimension. 2. For every u such that u r+1 = 0 and for which there exists i ≤ r such that u i = 1, the corresponding multiple ((x 1 + 1)(x 2 + 1) · · · (x r + 1) + (x r+1 + 1)) x u equals (x r+1 + 1) 
In the next lemma, we extend to all Boolean functions the result from [30] , recalled above, which dealt only with affine functions. Lemma 1. Let n be a positive integer. Let r and k be positive integers smaller than or equal to n. Let h be any n-variable Boolean function of algebraic degree r. Then
Proof:
If two elements of An k (h) have the same degree k part u∈F n 2 | wt(u)=k x u , then their sum belongs to An k−1 (h). We deduce that d k,h is smaller than or equal to the sum of d k−1,h and of the dimension of RM (k)/RM (k −
. Since h has degree r and since the dimension of An k (h) is invariant under affine equivalence, we can assume without loss of generality that h(x) = x 1 x 2 · · · x r + h (x), where h has degree at most r and where the term x 1 x 2 · · · x r has null coefficient in its ANF. For any choice of n − r bits u r+1 , . . . , u n , the restriction h ur+1,...,un of h obtained by fixing the variables x r+1 , . . . , x n to the values u r+1 , . . . , u n (respectively) has then degree r, and has therefore odd weight, since r is the number of its variables. Hence it has weight at least 1. For every (u r+1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ F n−r 2 , let us denote by x ur+1,...,un a vector x such that (x r+1 , . . . , x n ) = (u r+1 , . . . , u n ) and h(x) = 1. A function g(x) = u∈F n 2 | wt(u)≤k a u x u is an annihilator of h if and only if, for every x ∈ F n 2 such that h(x) = 1, we have g(x) = 0. A necessary condition is that g(x) = 0 for every x = x ur+1,...,un . If, in each of the resulting equations, we transfer all unknowns a u such that (u 1 , . . . , u r ) = (0, . . . , 0) to the right hand side, we obtain a system S in the unknowns a u such that (u 1 , . . . , u r ) = (0, . . . , 0). Replacing the right hand sides of the resulting equations by 0 (i.e. considering the corresponding homogeneous system S 0 ) gives the system that we obtain when we characterize the (n − r)-variable annihilators of degrees at most k of the constant function 1, considered as a function in the variables x r+1 , . . . , x n . Since the constant function 1 admits only the null function as annihilator, this means that the matrix of S 0 has full rank k i=0 n−r i
. Hence the rank of the whole system of equations u∈F n 2 | wt(u)≤k a u x u = 0, where x ranges over the support of h, is at least k i=0 n−r i and the dimension of A k (h) is at most
Note that, for k = n, Lemma 1 gives wt(h) ≥ max(
n − wt(h), but we already knew that wt(h) ≥ 2 n−r , see [36] .
Remarks:
1. The bound of Lemma 1, which generalizes and improves upon the bound
, is tight for every value of AI(h) (upper bounded by n immunity 1). When AI(h) = t > 1, it is achieved by the function of Proposition 3. Note that in this case, the value of r is large. We do not assert that the bound is also tight for every r.
2. We show in Appendix that the bound of Lemma 1 can be improved in some cases. We do not know whether the stronger inequality
can be true for every function of degree r and for some values of k (depending on the value of AI(h)). The functions of Proposition 1 are not counter-examples since they have algebraic immunity 1, and those of Proposition 3 neither since they have degree r > n − t. 4 The lower bound on the r-th order nonlinearity
We need a preliminary result before stating our main result.
Proposition 5. Let f be a Boolean function in n variables and let r, r be nonnegative integers such that r ≤ r and AI(f ) − r − 1 ≥ 0. For every n-variable function h of degree r and of algebraic immunity r , we have
In all cases, we have:
n − r i .
Proof:
Let k be any non-negative integer. A Boolean function of degree at most k belongs to An k (f h) if and only if the coefficients in its ANF satisfy a system of wt(f h) equations in
, then there exists an annihilator g of degree at most k of f h which is not an annihilator of h. Then, gh is a nonzero annihilator of f and has degree at most k + r. Thus, if k = AI(f ) − r − 1 ≥ 0, we arrive to a contradiction. We deduce that dim(An AI(f )−r−1 (f h)) ≤ dim(An AI(f )−r−1 (h)). This implies that
that is:
and
Theorem 1. Let f be any Boolean function in n variables and let r be any
More precisely, we have nl r (f ) ≥ max r ≤n (min (λ r , µ r )), where:
Let h be a function of degree at most r such that nl r (f ) = wt(f + h) = wt(f (h + 1)) + wt((f + 1)h). Proposition 5 implies nl r (f ) ≥ 2
. Let r be any nonnegative integer. If AI(h) ≥ r , then Proposition 5 applied to the functions f and h + 1 and to the functions f + 1 and h shows that wt(f (h + 1)) and wt((f + 1)h) are lower bounded by:
If AI(h) < r , then there exists g = 0 such that either g ∈ An r −1 (h + 1), and therefore supp(g) ⊆ supp(h), or g ∈ An r −1 (h), and therefore supp(g) ⊆ supp(h + 1). If supp(g) ⊆ supp(h), then we apply Proposition 5 (last sentence of) to the functions f and h + 1 and to the functions f + 1 and g. We obtain:
. The case where supp(g) ⊆ supp(h + 1) is similar.
Remarks:
1. Let δ be the algebraic degree of f . We assume that r < δ since, otherwise, nl r (f ) is null. According to McEliece's theorem (see [36] or [7] ), nl r (f ) is divisible by 2 of [8] for r = 1 (this is Lobanov's result). For r > 1, it improves upon it for every n ≤ 12 and if we go up to n ≤ 22, it improves upon it for every AI(f ) and most of the possible values of r (all of them, unless AI(f ) is very large). We give in Appendix the table of the values of the bounds of Theorem 1 and of [8] when AI(f ) = n 2 (i.e. when AI(f ) is optimal -this is the worst case for the bound of Theorem 1), for all values of n from 13 to 22 and for all values of r from 1 to AI(f ) − 1. 3. Both bounds of Theorem 1 and [8] show that, for most values of r, functions with high algebraic immunities are (much better than) "r-th order bent", in the sense of the paper [25] . In particular, they give more robust functions than those constructed in this paper. 4. In the case of optimal AI(f ) = when n and r are even; it gives
when n is even and r is odd,
when n and r are odd and finally
when n is odd and r is even. This is in all cases asymptotically greater than 2 n−r −(r+1)
when n tends to ∞ and r is fixed. 5. For r ≥ 2, the asymptotic lower bound 2 n−r 1 −
given by Theorem 1 is far from the asymptotic lower bound 2 n−1 −2 n/2 n r/2 ln 2 2r! given in [13] . But this last bound, which can be shown by a simple argument (counting the number of those functions whose r-th order nonlinearities are smaller than this number and showing that it is negligible compared to the number of all functions), is only a proof of existence and gives absolutely no idea of what can be explicitly a function with greater r-th order nonlinearity. Before our bound, as far as we know, obtaining for every low r > 1 an effective way of designing functions with provably non-weak r-th order nonlinearities was open. Moreover (and most importantly), the functions with high algebraic immunities satisfy our bound for every r of reasonably low value.
The consequences on the necessary criteria for the use of Boolean functions in symmetric ciphers
The impact of our result may be greater for block ciphers and for self-synchronizing stream ciphers than for synchronous stream ciphers. Indeed, the role of the rth order nonlinearity relatively to the currently known attacks has been more clearly shown for the former than for the latter (see [14, 23, 25, 27, 33, 35] ). As far as we know, and except in extreme situations, no explicit attack is known, that can use the approximation by a low degree function of the combining or filtering function in the pseudo-random generator of a stream cipher (except that an approximate pseudo-random sequence can be generated with a lower complexity, which may allow predicting bits after the observation of a part of the sequence). However, such attack may be found in the future and we know now that a high algebraic immunity will help in this matter. Note that a high algebraic immunity does not necessarily prevent the system from fast algebraic attacks, see e.g. [2] , but these attacks were not the subject of the present paper. The requirements concerning the Boolean functions used in symmetric ciphers are going towards a simplification. We know that the functions with optimum algebraic immunity are balanced, for n odd. A very high (first-order) nonlinearity takes care of the distance to linear structures, since we know that if a function has a nonzero linear structure then its nonlinearity is upper bounded by 2 n−1 − 2 n−1 2
and, therefore that, if its distance to linear structures is d then its nonlinearity is upper bounded by 2 n−1 − 2 n−1 2 + d. Lobanov's bound does not guarantee a resistance to attacks using approximations by affine functions, since such resistance needs (see e.g. [22, 5] ) a high nonlinearity, but Theorem 1 (with r ≥ 2) shows that having a high algebraic immunity helps protecting against attacks by approximations by non-affine functions of low degrees, since the complexity of such attacks increases fastly with the degree. However, the problem of determining functions meeting all the criteria needed for the combining or the filtering model of stream ciphers is still wide open.
